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Abstract Looking at Egypt before, during and after the Arab
Spring, this paper examines the intersection of Christian Copts,
the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian army, moderate Muslims
and secular groups. In turn, it examines the Obama administra-
tion’s policies toward Egypt. It discloses the surprising finding
that the only consistent aspect of the administration’s policy
toward Egypt has been outreach to and engagement with the
Muslim Brotherhood. At no time before or after the
Brotherhood’s ascent to prominence in Egyptian politics and
society did the administration make support of the Brotherhood
conditional. At no time did it useUS leverage - given themassive
amount of financial and military aid Egypt was depending on,
and given the new Egyptian government’s desire for prestige in
the world community–to pressure the Morsi government to
respect human rights, religious liberty and the impartial rule of
law. Arguing that American foreign policy at its best is rooted in
democratic ideals, this paper asks whether the United States,
while respecting that Egyptians must choose their leaders and
their political system, could have done more to encourage a
positive strategic, moral and political outcome.
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law . Civil society . Barack Obama . Hillary Clinton . Arab
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American foreign policy at its best combines moral and prac-
tical concerns. It emphasizes the security of the free world
(necessary in a world where global threats lie just beneath the
surface) and the principles of freedom (essential to expanding
the realm of human dignity and political liberty.) As the
United States became a world power after World War II, it
did so in terms that advanced both our defenses and our ideals.
With the world reeling from the fascist assault, and facing the
new threat of Soviet expansionism, America asserted influ-
ence as never before. While forming alliances and economic
and strategic partnerships throughout the world, the United
States also actively promoted democratic principles and
sought to expand the number of representative democracies.
Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Reagan all insisted that
our principles were what made our power important, and
espoused those principles in their speeches and documents.
Therewere timeswhen theUnited States sullied its own cause
and credibility by making its enemy’s enemy a friend. But, the
overriding goal during the postwar years was the expansion of
the realm of political and economic freedom. Testimony to that
emphasis: Most European and East Asian countries went from
the postwar period of instability and hardship to democratic
advances, economic prosperity, and relative external security.
Europe and East Asia benefited from the American defense
shield, from economic interaction with and aid from the United
States, and from the projection of American/democratic ideals.
When the Cold War ended with communist dictatorships col-
lapsing one after the other, this was a victory not just for our
military and material power, but also for the human rights and
individual rights that the free world, at its best, embodies.
In spite of widespread assumptions to the contrary, even in the
Middle East, post-World War II American policies included
humanitarian and liberalization efforts. The United States
pressured European powers to help prepare former enemy terri-
tories for “self-rule.” Roosevelt appointed Patrick J. Hurley to
map out ways to seek “free governments and free enterprise,”
and to put an end to “exploitation and imperialism.”Truman both
decided to support the creation of a Jewish state in Israel and
stated his belief that the peoples of the Middle East were “de-
serving of post-war political independence.”Eisenhower went so
far as to support Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser against
the Europeans–even after Nasser shocked the world by announc-
ing Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal.When English and
French planes bombed Egyptian airfields in response, the United
States condemned the assault. But theUnited States would not be
rewarded for supporting Egypt.
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Increasingly under the sway of Soviet power and extremist
ideals, many post World War II “self-determination” move-
ments in the Middle East, including Nasser’s, started to define
themselves less in terms of political freedom than in terms of
Soviet-style “liberation” from capitalist, western powers, in-
cluding the United States. By the time of Kennedy’s presiden-
cy, post-colonial regimes in Syria, Egypt, Iraq and elsewhere
had devolved into dictatorships. As political and religious
extremism rose, it was increasingly tempting to befriend au-
thoritarian leaders who could help the United States hold
extremists and/or communists at bay. Such was the case with
the US alliance with Egyptian strongman Hosni Mubarak, a
repressive leader whose transgressions the US mostly
overlooked for the sake of Egypt’s cooperation on Israeli
peace issues, terrorism and regional security.
Still, U.S. involvement in the Middle East continued to
include financial aid, health, infrastructure and agriculture
projects, and support of democratization. Some are so bold
as to argue that, in spite of alleged American antipathy to
Islam, most of America’s recent involvement in the Middle
East has been intended to help Muslim people. Asserts Robert
Lieber, “Remarkably, most of the post-Cold War American
military interventions abroad have been to save Muslim pop-
ulations from starvation, ethnic cleansing, civil war, invasion,
and oppression–as large numbers of Kuwaitis, Somalis,
Kurds, Bosnians, Kosovars, Iraqi Shiites, and the people of
Afghanistan, especially women, can attest. Moreover, the
absorptive character of the United States has made it far better
than any of the countries of Europe or Asia in accommodating
and integrating Muslims”1
By the time of the George W. Bush presidency, there were
two currents shaking and transforming the Middle East–one
toward Islamic extremism, the other toward political liberali-
zation. Many in the west were blind to the later. They claimed
that Arabs, being culturally different from the West, didn’t
want democracy, and wouldn’t know what to do with it if they
had it. They thought Middle Eastern nations were not “ready”
for democracy because they had no democratic traditions.
(Never mind that post-World War II Germany and Japan
defied that logic; these Democratic allies had “traditions” that
were far from democratic.) In addition, with cultural and
moral relativism very much in vogue, influential intellectuals
argued that anti-democratic regimes were just as valid as
democratic ones, and that our best policy toward oppressive
regimes was to refrain from judgment and find “common
interests.”
The truth is that the majority of Middle Easterners longed
for more freedom, both economically and politically. They
were tired of the stagnation, corruption and repression of
centralized regimes and sought alternatives to authoritarian
governments. The IraqWar did not stem the tide of discontent;
instead, democracy movements grew during the Bush years.
The war did cause major resentment in the region, but so did
realpolitik policies which had caused the United States to form
reluctant alliances with Middle Eastern dictators. Indeed,
claims that the United States supported governments that
denied their people rights caused some middle easterners to
turn to Islamic political movements as opposed to more
secular/Western ones. Claims of U.S. collusion with repres-
sive governments had been one of the selling points of Al
Qaeda itself.
It was thus Western intellectuals, not Middle Easterners,
who were upset by the Bush administration’s focus upon the
Middle East’s “freedom deficit.” As the Arab Human
Development Report and other internal surveys showed, sen-
timent against the freedom deficit was overwhelming in the
Middle East itself by the time President Obama and Secretary
Clinton took office. Unlike American intellectuals, Arab in-
tellectuals who contributed to the post 9/11 Arab Human
Development Report pushed the idea of democracy, stating,
“The freedom deficit [in the Arab region] undermines human
development and is one of the most painful manifestations of
lagging political development.”2 Sentiment for more freedom
was not limited to intellectuals. As Shibley Telhami shows in
his analysis of public opinion polls, most people wanted
human rights and democratization. Stated Telhami regarding
the Arab Spring, “It was hardly surprising to discover Arabs
were angry with their rulers. In fact, every year, after
conducting the Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll in Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon, and the United
Arab Emirates, the question that leapt from the findings was
not, ‘When will Arabs have reason to revolt?’ but ‘Why
haven’t Arabs revolted yet?”3
Theywould revolt soon thereafter, when the “Arab Spring”
shook an entire region and opened up entirely new possibili-
ties. What a pity that the Obama administration was complete-
ly unprepared for the situation and incapable of nurturing or
influencing it. It is, of course, true that there was a parallel
movement in the Arab world, for the Islamization of govern-
ment, the imposition of Sharia Law and the conversion of
infidels. With this the case, why wouldn’t the United States
use its very substantial leverage and the steadfast enunciation
of democratic principles to encourage the one and discourage
the other? We should not attempt to dictate terms, but neither
should we squander our influence or abet negative outcomes.
1 Robert J. Lieber, The American Era: Power And Strategy For The 21st
Century. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.181.
2 United Nations Development Fund for Economic and Social
Development, “Arab Human Development Report 2002: Creating
Opportunities for Future Generations,” United Nations Publication
2002, overview-2.
3 Shadi Hamid et al., The Arab Awakening: America and the
Transformation of the Middle East . Washington D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, 2011, p.13
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When Egyptians succeeded in overthrowing Hosni
Mubarak, the time was right for the United States to reach
out to the diverse peoples fighting for respect within Egyptian
society, to help those people develop a framework for civil
society and to form foreign policy toward Egypt that was
grounded in both American interests and American principles.
Instead, at no time did the Obama administration use US
leverage-given the massive amount of financial and military
aid Egypt was depending on, and given the new Egyptian
government’s desire for prestige in the world community–to
pressure the Egyptian government to respect individual rights,
religious liberty and the impartial rule of law. Obama, Clinton
and Panetta made the very occasional weak statement in favor
of such things, but their policy was defined by not promoting
these things; having at first defended the legitimacy of the
Mubarak regime, they then defended the Muslim
Brotherhood’s legitimacy, and abetted the group’s consolida-
tion of power. Neither before nor after the Brotherhood’s
ascent to prominence in Egyptian politics and society did the
administration make that support conditional.
When we look at Egypt’s recent troubles we must ask
whether the United States could have done more to encourage
a positive strategic, political and moral outcome. It seems safe
to say that clarity of vision and purpose on the part of the United
States might have helped. As the revolution unfurled, an en-
thused U.S. stand for democracy and human rights were in
order, as was an emphasis upon the benefits to the new
Egyptian government of maintaining cooperative ties with the
West and Israel, and supporting pluralism at home. Respect for
sovereignty needn’t translate into doing nothing to foster polit-
ical and religious freedom or to strengthen our strategic posi-
tion. Precisely because of ascendant factions in Egypt desiring
Islamic rule, a heartfelt stand for liberty as well as an attempt to
maintain geopolitical influence were and are in order.
So, let’s retrace our steps, and look at missed opportu-
nities and skewed priorities, not in order to place blame,
but in order to move toward better policy. Egypt is a
vibrant land and the revolt against Mubarak was filled
with people from all walks of life and different religions
who wanted more freedom, more opportunity, and less
state interference in their lives. Their dreams have been
thwarted by the Islamists in power and by the still-
repressive military and security forces. But, as their pro-
tests in the streets indicate, their dreams have not died.
Background to Revolution
Glenn Kessler of the Washington Post has documented the
George W. Bush administration’s efforts (both behind the
scenes and overt) to pressure theMubarak government toward
reform. In addition to criticizing the regime for its human
rights abuses, Bush began to give money to democracy and
good-governance programs and organizations that were inde-
pendent of Mubarak’s regime. That effort, according to
Kessler, was “largely shelved” by the Obama administration:
“For fiscal year 2009, the administration immediately halved
the money for democracy promotion in Egypt; the civil soci-
ety funds were slashed 70 percent, to $7 million. Meanwhile,
money that was to be given directly to civil society groups was
eliminated and the administration agreed to once again fund
only those institutions that had Mubarak’s seal of approval.”4
Funding for Voice of America-type programs in the Middle
East was sliced as well.
Probably due to a combination of external and internal
pressure, perhaps also reflecting differences with his father,
by the time Obama came to power, Hosni Mubarak’s son
Gamal was promising reforms that included privatizing
Egypt’s economy and freeing it from the military’s grip. But,
the long repressed Egyptian people didn’t trust Mubarak’s
son, and didn’t want reform in the hands of Mubarak’s suc-
cessor. They wanted free elections and the chance to choose
their leaders. As Alaa al-Aswany explained in On the State of
Egypt , “The argument that Gamal Mubarak will be a civilian
president for Egypt is [also] based on a fallacy, because what
defines the nature of a regime is not the profession of a
president but the way in which he assumes power. … If
Gamal Mubarak gains the presidency of Egypt, this will not
put an end tomilitary rule but merely add to it another disaster.
Autocracy will be combined with a hereditary system, and
after that what will there be to stop Gamal Mubarak from
granting the presidency to his son or nephew?”5
Mubarak had stayed in power for thirty years through
increasingly fraudulent elections. Asserts Shadi Hamid, “If
there was any doubt the status quo was untenable, the
November 2010 elections–arguably the most fraudulent in
Egyptian history–confirmed what many long suspected: re-
form through the existing system had become impossible.”6
Corruption and cronyism were endemic to his regime, as were
detentions by the dreaded security services. The regime had
particularly targeted the Muslim Brotherhood who were sub-
ject to arbitrary arrests, torture and disappearances.
Interestingly, the Mubarak regime tolerated Egypt’s grow-
ing number of Islamic extremists, including Salafists, many of
whom had been influenced by Wahhabism while working in
Saudi Arabia or had been swayed by Wahhabi broadcasts and
preachers. The reason, according to Al Aswani, is that Salafist
4 Glenn Kessler, “The Fact Checker,” The Washington Post. 10 February
2011, http://voices.washingtonpos.com.
5 Alaa Al Aswany, On the State of Egypt: What Made The Revolution
Inevitable , trans. Jonathan Wright. New York: Vintage Books, 2011, 8.
6 Shadi Hamid et al., The Arab Awakening: America and the
Transformation of the Middle East . Washington D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, 2011, p.103
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Wahhabism actually enables despotic government as it urges
Muslims to obey their rulers and forbids rebellion against
Muslim leaders. Also interesting is the fact that, for the sake
of appeasement and keeping Islamist violence at bay,
Mubarak increasingly went along with Islamist demands to
treat Christians like second-class citizens.7
Egypt’s Christian Copts are one of the most ancient
Christian communities, tracing their roots back to the Gospel
writer Mark who brought Christianity into Egypt in the first
century. They are also the largest Christian community in the
Middle East. As scholar Edward Wakin put it in The Lonely
Minority, “The Copts are a major test of modern coexistence
between a large Christian minority and a Muslim majority”
and have been “the major transmitters of Western and modern
attitudes in Egypt.”8 For most of the AD period, the Copts
were a harshly persecuted minority. Their position did not
begin to improve until the early 19th century, when
Mohamed Said Pasha abolished the Jizya (a tax on non-
Muslims) and allowed Copts to enroll in the army.
Conditions continued to improve throughout the 19th century
under the leadership of Pope Cyril IV, and in the first half of
the 20th century (known as the Golden Age by the Copts).
Copts participated in the Egyptian national movement for
independence and occupied many influential positions.
In the second half of the twentieth century, from the time of
Nasser and through the time of Sadat and Mubarak, the Copts
faced discriminatory policies which generally fell short of
outright persecution. The Copts were an important part of
Egyptian society even though they lacked equal rights and
equal protection under the law. Wakin documented the insti-
tutionalized stratification which favored Muslims, and the
quotas for Christians in all areas of Egyptian life–government,
education and business. Copts who dared to proselytize were
regularly detained, while those who agreed not to make waves
were granted certain benefits. Copts faced discrimination in
matters such as housing and church construction permits, and
faced major hurdles in vying for high positions in society and
government. Those Muslims who chose to harass and intim-
idate Christians could generally do so with immunity.
Mubarak’s regime was hard for Christians, but it was not at
all as hard as Iran’s or Somalia’s or North Korea’s or Saudi
Arabia’s. And it was not nearly as hard as it would be under
Mohammed Morsi. Coptic scholar Samuel Tadros explains,
“Their country’s transformation wasn’t sudden, but every year
brought more public Islamization. As the veil spread, Coptic
women felt increasingly different, alien and marked. Verbal
abuse came from schoolteachers, bystanders in the bus station
who noticed the cross on the wrist, or commentators on state
television. But life was generally bearable. He [Hosni
Mubarak] was no friend to the Copts, but neither was he foe.
His police often turned a blind eye when Coptic homes and
shops were attacked by mobs, and the courts never punished
perpetrators-but the president wasn’t an Islamist. He even
interfered sometimes to give permission to build a church, or
to make Christmas a national holiday.”9
Life was “generally bearable,” but the historic cycles of
repression and the rise of Islamist extremism meant that there
was reason for vigilance and the pronouncement and defense
of democratic principles, not just on the part of Egyptian
human and religious rights groups, but also on the part of
those in positions of influence in the United States.
By the time President Obama came to office, oppression of
Christians by Muslim extremists had intensified, and
Mubarak’s government, under pressure itself, was doing little
to stop it. In spite of Mubarak’s often successful attempts to
convince the West that Egypt was pluralistic and tolerant,
numerous sources indicated that Egyptian authorities were
not offering effective protection to Copts who complained of
harassment, attack or rape by Muslim perpetrators. Coptic
Christian complainants were often pressured by government
authorities to engage in “reconciliation sessions” and were
sometimes arrested themselves as a way for the government
to avoid prosecuting alleged Muslim assailants. In
Persecuted: The Global Assault on Christians, authors Paul
Marshall, Lela Gilbert and Nina Shea describe the kidnapping
of Coptic girls for forced conversions to Islam, citing a report
that documented twenty five abductions. They also point to a
2010 letter written by 18 bipartisan members of Congress to
the State Department concerning allegations that Coptic girls
were being subjected to “fraud, physical and sexual violence,
captivity, forced marriage, and exploitation in forced domestic
servitude or commercial sexual exploitation” and that finan-
cial benefits were being granted to those who forced conver-
sion of the victims.10
Of course, where the law favors some, it cannot be relied on
to protect anyone. The Australian Government’s 2010
Refugee Tribunal Report cited evidence that both Coptic
Christian students and Muslim Brotherhood students were
the subject of regular discrimination and mistreatment by
government authorities. 11
In spite of the rise of Islamist extremism in Egypt, themajority
of Muslims in Egypt were moderate compared to the extremists.
They longed for political and economic reforms which would
allow themmore opportunity and a better life. Indeed, in the lead
7 Michael Youssef, Ph.D., Blindsided: The Radical Islamic Conquest .
U.S.: Kobri Books, 2012, Chapter Ten.
8 Edward Wakin, A Lonely Minority. New York: W. Morrow &
Company, 1963, pp. 4, 30.
9 Samuel Tadros, “The Christian Exodus From Egypt,” The Wall Street
Journal, 11 October 2012, http://online.wsj.com.
10 Paul Marshall, and Lela Gilbert, and Nina Shea, Persecuted: The
Global Assault On Christians . Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2013, p.192.
11 Australian Government Refugee Review Tribunal, Country Advice
Egypt, 26 February 2010.
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up to the revolution, Muslim youths, Christian youths, the edu-
cated class, women and secularists were all fed up with the lack
of political freedom and the economic stagnation that resulted
from theMubarak government’s authoritarian policies. Given the
wave of discontent throughout the Arab world, and given the
inherent dangers to Christians in any revolutionary situation, it
would have been an excellent time for theUS government to take
a principled stand for religious and political freedom. Instead, the
administration immediately halved the money for democracy
promotion in Egypt and slashed civil society funds 70%.
What of the Muslim Brotherhood, the organization which
would seize the upper hand in the new Egypt, and the organiza-
tion with which the Obama administration has so positively and
actively engaged?An honest assessment leads to this conclusion:
There was reason to engage with the Brotherhood since they
were more moderate than other organized Islamist/Egyptian
groups. There was also reason to fear and mistrust the
Brotherhood and to put all kinds of provisos on any support
we gave them. On the positive side, unlike the more radical
Salafists, the Brotherhood had eschewed violence as a way of
achieving its goals. Revolution against Mubarak, for the
Brotherhood, was also revolution against the repressive political
system which had prevented them from running for office and
denied them political equality and opportunity. Marc Lynch
asserts, “Brotherhood andSalafi-jihadist figures arguedwith each
other constantly, denouncing each other over ideology and tac-
tics. Lumping together the Brotherhood with al Qaeda would
have been a major analytical error with serious policy conse-
quences.”12 From a moral standpoint, too, there was reason for
the United States to reach out to the Brotherhood. They had been
targeted and persecuted by the Mubarak regime, and our own
democratic principles meant that we should give them a chance.
But, both the long-term goals of the Brotherhood, and the
ideological trajectory of the Brotherhood at the time of the
Arab Spring should have given the United States major con-
cerns about what the Brotherhood would do when and if it
actually came to power. (The rising persecution and harass-
ment of Egyptian Christians at the time should have added to
these concerns.) The Brotherhood has always been clear on its
goal of a global Muslim caliphate in which the Quran is the
source of all law. Its slogan is “Islam is the Solution.” Former
Ambassador to Egypt Daniel Kurtzer asserted, “The Muslim
Brotherhood since its founding in 1928 has had one goal, and
one goal only. And that is to establish an Islamic state in Egypt
as a precursor to an Islamic state throughout the region. …
They are very flexible on tactics. And I think we need to be
careful not to mistake their tactical flexibility for their long-
range strategic goals.”13 Although less radical than
Brotherhood offshoots that sought violent means to Islamic
ends, the Egyptian Brotherhood had not wavered from com-
mitment to Sharia Law nor from its refusal to recognize
Israel’s right to exist.
Moreover, although it was less radical , it was still ideo-
logically extreme. It imposed restrictive dictates on women,
made racist declarations about Christians and Jews, insisted
that the Coptic population was much smaller than it was, and
saw political institutions as vehicles for Islamization. In a
2005 interview with the newspaper Azzman , Mohammad
Habib, key member of the Brotherhood’s highest official
body, the Guidance Council, stated, “The Muslim
Brotherhood rejects any constitution based on secular and
civil laws, and as a consequence the Copts cannot take on
the form of a political entity in this country. When the move-
ment will come to power, it will replace the current constitu-
tion with an Islamic one, according to which a non-Muslim
will not be allowed to hold a senior post, whether in the state
or the army, because this right should be exclusively granted
to Muslims. If the Egyptians decide to elect a Copt for the
presidential post, we will issue a protest against such an
action, on the basis that the choice should be ours.” 14
In addition, theMuslimBrotherhood had taken amore radical
turn by the time of the Arab Spring, and was marginalizing and
forcing out the small group of young reformers who were more
open-minded and pragmatic than the majority. In 2008,
hardliners were declared the winners in all five seats being
contested in elections to replace empty seats on the Guidance
Council. The next year, the most prominent reformist member,
Abdel Monem Abou el-Fotouh, and Mohammad Habib, who
had recently softened his position regarding the Copts, lost their
seats, while the conservative but conciliatoryMohammedMehdi
Akef stepped down. Over the next few years, many more re-
formist leaders were excluded from positions of influence, or left
the organization. By the time revolution broke out, the Muslim
Brotherhood was dominated by ideologues who had neither
desire for nor experience in forging democratic compromises.
It is inconceivable that the US government would not know
that an Egypt ruled by the Muslim Brotherhood would pose a
threat not only to Christians, but to any Egyptians who didn’t
go along with the group’s religious-political vision. As Magdi
Khalil put it after the Brotherhood won 88 seats in post-
revolutionary parliamentary elections, “Actually, the Copts
are not the only ones to have serious misgivings about the
latest developments in Egypt’s political life: women, liberals,
civil society supporters, leftists, and other advocates of de-
mocracy share the same sentiment. The champions of civil
society are haunted by the nightmarish vision of religious
government, and it goes without saying that the Copts, as a
religious minority, are particularly concerned about the
12 Marc Lynch, “Did We Get the Muslim Brotherhood Wrong?” Foreign
Policy, 10 April 2013. www.foreignpolicy.com.
13 Daniel Kurtzer, “Is Revolution What’s Best For The Rest?” Foreign
Policy, 4 February 2011. www.foreignpolicy.com.
14 Magdi Khalil, “The Muslim Brotherhood and the Copts.”
ThreatsWatch, 20 April 2006. http://threatswatch.org.
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Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda with regards to the creation of
an Islamic state and Islamic nationalism.…Most importantly,
the Muslim Brotherhood’s history, actions, website, state-
ments and newspaper articles confirm the intent to establish
a state that has a religious nature and not a civil one.”15
So too, it is inconceivable that the US government was
simply naïve about Mohamed Morsi’s ultimate goals when he
ran for president. In his years as a parliamentarian, from 2000
to 2005, Morsi sought to make civil society, the state and the
private sector more in accord with the Quran’s principles. He
was elected by the Brotherhood’s Guidance Council to be the
first president of the Freedom and Justice Party, which was
founded in 2011. While serving in this capacity, Morsi did, in
his willingness to work with other groups, reveal the “prag-
matic” side that the Obama administration praised. However
he also revealed his dogmatic side, as he stated that the “two-
state solution is nothing but a delusion concocted by the brutal
usurper of the Palestinian lands” that it was "insulting" to
suggest that damage from aircraft collision brought down
the World Trade Center and that no evidence had identified
Al-Qaeda terrorists as the “real culprits.”16
A USA Today article entitled “Egyptian President’s Aims
Unknown” published just after Morsi won the presidential
election, cited a cross-section of expert opinion and was
picked up by newspapers around the world. Keeping in mind
that, if USA Today had access to this opinion, the US govern-
ment certainly did as well, the article is worth excerpting:
“But his years spent studying in America have not dissuad-
ed him from the most doctrinaire beliefs of the Muslim
Brotherhood, which has called for religious law, segregation
of the sexes and scorns the influence of the West and Israel,
experts say. ‘If you look at his public statements over time, he
tends to say provocative things about the U.S. and Israel,’ says
Shadi Hamid, an expert in Islamist political parties at the
Brookings Doha Center. … As a leader of the [Muslim
Brotherhood] movement, Morsi is a firm believer in sharia,
or Islamic law, as he made evident on the campaign trail. …
‘He was a loyal brother, an enforcer.’ … He is ‘an icon of the
extremists in the (Muslim Brotherhood),’ says Eric Trager, an
analyst with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy
who is in Cairo. Trager says Morsi rose to the top of the
Brotherhood's cult-like hierarchy by adherence to dogma at
each level of his ascent. He is one of the main authors of the
group's 2007 platform that said women and Christians should
not be able to run for president, a stand that was later dropped,
he says. Morsi is not likely to make serious concessions to
liberals and Christians despite promises to do so and will not
give them positions of real power, Trager says.”17
Clearly, there was no reason for the US government to be
sanguine regarding Egypt’s political outcome, and many rea-
sons for the United States to be leary. The Obama administra-
tion was privy to very troubling information about the Muslim
Brotherhood and Mohamed Morsi himself. At best, its assess-
ment of the group and of the group’s leader should have been
very mixed.
Nevertheless, even before the revolution provided the
Brotherhood with vastly enhanced status and unprecedent-
ed opportunities, the White House treated the Brotherhood
warmly rather than cautiously, and as a mainstream political
party rather than as a controversial, or at least suspect,
political/religious group. In, 2009, the White House invited
the Islamic Society of North America to Obama’s inaugu-
ration even though the Justice Department had blacklisted
the Brotherhood as co-conspirator in the Holy Land Trial.
Obama invited the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to his
Cairo Speech as “special guests,” infuriating Mubarak.
Obama was urged by Egyptian Copts to mention their
plight in his Cairo Speech. But, he devoted only half a
sentence to their situation, while making a strong and re-
peated case for tolerance of Islam. He appointed a
Brotherhood-tied Islamist, Rashad Hussain, as US envoy
to the Organization of the Islamic Conference and, in 2010,
sent Hussain to Egypt to meet with the Brotherhood’s
Grand Mufti.
It is significant that secularists and Christians in Egypt
received no comparably supportive signals from the
administration.
Revolution
Protestors in Tahrir Square and other sites across Egypt
demanded political reform, an end to the hated emergency
law and free and fair elections. Different groups and indi-
viduals, including the Muslim Brotherhood, moderate
Muslims, secularists, many women and many Christian
Copts came together in support of this cause. There were
even signs of unity and support between Brotherhood pro-
testors and Coptic protestors. As Vivian Ibrahim puts it,
“As images of Tahrir Square were beamed via satellite and
the world watched a ‘televised revolution,’ the iconic im-
ages of national unity were brought to the fore. Copts stood
guard over Muslims as they performed Friday prayers in the
square, while Muslims in return stood guard over Coptic
Sunday mass.”18
The April 6 Movement, which initiated the revolt in Cairo,
made explicit demands regarding democracy and human
rights. Although some are already re-writing history by
15 Ibid.
16 “Egyptian Presidential Candidate Doubts Al Qaeda Role in 9/11.”
www.washingtontimes.com, May, 2012.
17 Sarah Lynch, and Oren Dorell, “Egyptian president’s aims unknown.”
USA Today, 27 June 2012. http://usatoday30.usatoday.com.
18 Vivian Ibrahim,“Egypt: One Year After Mubarak.” Fair Observer, 10
February 2012. http://www.fairobserver.com.
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defining the uprisings that began in Tunisia in terms of
Islamic-extremist goals, this is a flawed depiction. Historian
James Gelvin delineates distinctions between the goals of the
Arab Spring and the goals of organizations like al Qaeda:
“Although protesters in various countries found inspiration
and learned from protests elsewhere in the Arab world, each
uprising was a national uprising, targeting a specific govern-
ment against which protestors held specific grievances. Al-
Qaedists believe that the Crusader-Zionist conspiracy against
Islam obligates every Muslim to engage in ‘defensive jihad,’
which, for them, means armed struggle. Yet from Tunisia to
Egypt to Bahrain, protesters embraced the tactic of nonviolent
resistance. Finally, al-Qaedists believe that Muslims should
obey the rule of God, not the rule of man, and that true
freedom lies in obedience to Islamic law and freedom from
the materialism and oppression of the West. Yet the central
demands of the protesters include democratic governance–
rule by the majority, not by the word of God–and respect for
internationally accepted norms of human rights. These are
certainly not al-Qaeda’s ideals.” 19
Daniel Byman notes that the Arab uprisings actually re-
moved one of Al Qaeda’s reasons for being: “When dictators
reigned supreme in Arab lands, al Qaeda could score points by
denouncing despotism–Zawahiri even wrote a book
condemning the crimes of Mubarak. When dictators such as
Mubarak fall to pressure from pro-democracy protestors, how-
ever, al Qaeda loses one of its best recruiting pitches: the
repression Arab governments inflict on their civilians.” 20
Still, there was reason to fear that the Egyptian revolution,
like somany before it, would take a radical turn. There are two
things about the Egyptian revolution that those inside the US
government would have immediately seen that the rest of us
did not. First, the Egyptian military had a vested interest in the
revolution because the military was vehemently opposed to
succession of power to Mubarak’s son Gamal, who was
promising to free the economy from military control. The
military influenced all aspects of Egyptian society, including
the economy, and its oligarchical power was threatened by the
prospect of reform. Second, although the revolution included
various parts of Egyptian society, including youths eager for
western-style freedom, the best organized among the parts
was the Muslim Brotherhood. Evidence indicates that most
Brotherhood demonstrators were genuine in their desire for
free elections. On the other hand, their philosophy and history
were cause for concern over how committed to reform they
would be once they achieved a higher place in Egyptian
politics and society.
After the Revolution, the Egyptian military and theMuslim
Brotherhood were, in the words of Stratfor Intelligence ,
“savvy powerbrokers” in that they were careful not to pose
too great a challenge to each other, since they both had an
interest in marginalizing other groups.21 The military utilized
recurring street violence to “divide and conquer” and to keep
the army’s position strong, while the Brotherhood kept its own
people off the streets in those cases where a military crackdown
on protests worked to its advantage, in that it intimidated those
looking for a different kind of change in Egyptian society. The
military, in turn, permitted elections in which the Muslim
Brotherhood was fully accepted as candidates. No wonder
Iran, in spite of the divide between Shiite (Iranian) and Sunni
(Egyptian) Muslims, immediately, chillingly, praised the
Revolution, predicting that it heralded an Islamic Middle East.
Given all of this–given the power vacuum created by the
revolution, given Iran’s overt eagerness regarding the outcome,
given that Egypt was the United States’ best Middle Eastern
ally apart from Israel, and that that alliance was essential to
Israel’s existential concerns, given the perilous position of
Christian Copts, women and secularists in any Brotherhood-
dominated government, it behooves us to ask: Why didn’t the
Obama administration put more effort into encouraging demo-
cratic reform andmoderate political forces before the revolution
occurred? Why did President Obama, after days of indecision
over whether to support “stability” via the maintenance of
Mubarak or the “stable transition” to a post-Mubarak govern-
ment, then decide to insist that Mubarak step down immediate-
ly? Why did Mubarak have to “go now” if the much worse
Ahmadinejad, and the much worse Bashar Assad, in the face of
a much more widespread collapse of support, did not?
Why didn’t the administration use our substantial leverage to
influence the rebellion, once it ousted Mubarak, toward contin-
ued friendly relations with the United States, genuine democratic
reforms and continued support of the peace treaty with Israel?
After all, the United States routinely gives Egypt two billion
dollars a year most of which goes to military and technical aid,
and the rest of which goes to humanitarian assistance.
Instead, as the revolution heated up, and before Mubarak’s
exit, the administration volunteered that it “accepted” and
“welcomed” the Muslim Brotherhood’s participation in
Egypt’s “political dialogue.” The White House also declared
that all opposition groups (including the Muslim
Brotherhood) should be represented in the post-Mubarak gov-
ernment. In an NPR interview in January, Secretary Clinton
said it was in the “best interest” of the United States to have
“more democracy, more openness, more participation.” She
also said, “Today, we learned that the Muslim Brotherhood
has decided to participate, which suggests that they are now
involved in the dialogue that we have encouraged.22 This
19 James L. Gelvin, The Arab Uprisings:What Everyone Needs To Know.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2012, 148.
20 Shadi Hamid et al., The Arab Awakening , 77.
21 Stratfor Intelligence. www.stratfor.com
22 Liane Hansen, “Clinton Sticks to U.S. Principles on Egyptian
Reform.” NPR News/Weekend Edition , 6 February 2011. http://www.
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positive stance toward the Brotherhood was new for the
United States and was big news. Headlines across the world
read, “ClintonWelcomesMuslim Brotherhood Participation.”
It was one thing to welcome Brotherhood participation after
the fact; it was another to actively encourage it beforehand.
In an article that is no longer available online, the NY
Times reported on January 4th that the administration was
seeking “close ties” with the Muslim Brotherhood, correctly
adding: “The administration’s overtures—including high-
level meetings in recent weeks—constitute a historic shift in
a foreign policy held by successive American administrations
that steadfastly supported the autocratic government of
President Hosni Mubarak in part out of concern for the
Brotherhood’s Islamist ideology and historic ties to militants.”
Brotherhood participation in presidential elections was so
controversial in Egypt itself that, even after Mubarak’s ouster,
Brotherhood leaders themselves promised not to run for elec-
tion. Rather than attempting to publicly hold them to this
pledge, or at least staying neutral on the subject, Obama
and Clinton again publicly offered support for Muslim
Brotherhood participation in Egyptian elections. “It’s in our
interests to engage with all of the parties that are competing for
parliament or the presidency” a senior U.S. official told
Reuters , on condition of anonymity.23 Emboldened, the
Brotherhood formed the Freedom and Justice Party for up-
coming elections with Dr. Saad Ketatni as its leader. The new
party’s spokesperson noted that “when we talk about the
slogans of the revolution–freedom, social justice, equality–
all of these are in the Sharia.” (Islamic Law) Even after all of
this, however, Egyptian Brotherhood leaders reiterated that
they would not run a candidate for President and would not
compete for more than a third of the seats in a new parliament.
Adding to the supportive signals the Brotherhood received
from the US administration, the day beforeMubarak resigned,
the White House sent Intelligence Czar James Clapper to
Congress to testify that the Brotherhood is a “moderate” and
“largely secular organization” that has “eschewed violence”
and has “no overarching goal, at least internationally.”24 As if
to publicly dispute Clapper’s claims, the Brotherhood’s spir-
itual leader Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi was given a hero’s wel-
come in Tahrir Square. Further, the Brotherhood vowed to tear
up Egypt’s thirty year peace treaty with Israel and quickly
worked to formally reestablish Egyptian ties with Hamas. The
timing was strange, then, when President Obama publicly
demanded that Israel relinquish land to the Palestinians, and
the Justice Department announced that there would be no
further prosecution of Muslim Brotherhood front groups for
funneling millions to Hamas. In a break from U.S. tradition,
the administration announced in June that it would formally
recognize and resume diplomatic contact with the Muslim
Brotherhood.
Is it mere coincidence that Brotherhood activists were
emboldened? (History reveals again and again that aspiring
extremist leaders opportunistically exploit the friendly ges-
tures and conciliatory signals of democratic powers.) Also in
June: Nina Shea reported in the New Republic on “a
reinvigorated effort by some of the country’s more radical
Islamists to establish Egypt’s identity as a thoroughly
Islamicized and Arabicized state” and noted “a heightened
campaign of violence” against the Copts. Shea feared this
would led to “a mass exodus from the country-an event which,
if it transpires, will have devastating effects on the multicul-
tural makeup of the entire Middle East.”25 In reference to the
Coptic Bishop’s public attention to the problem, Shea urged,
“We should heed the Bishop’s cry for help before it’s too late.”
Shea was right. Shortly after the Revolution, incidences of
violence toward and bullying of Christians increased
dramatically.
Adding further to the supportive, emboldening messages
the Brotherhood received from the US, a number of meetings
between US Ambassador Anne Patterson and Brotherhood
members ensued shortly after the Revolution. The ambassador
seemed to favor the Brotherhood and hardline Salaafists over
the secularists and Christians. In fact, she is said to have turned
down requests from heads of political parties and other secu-
larist politicians. Deputy Secretary of StateWilliam Burns and
Senator John Kerry sent similarly supportive messages by
visiting Muslim Brotherhood headquarters and talking with
one of their revolutionary leaders, Khairat El Shatar, whom
Kerry went so far as to publicly praise. Note that these meet-
ings occurred before the Muslim Brotherhood had emerged as
the leader in post-revolutionary Egypt.
Frida Ghitis reported upon a turning point in August of
2011. Tahrir Square “became the scene of a stunning change at
the vanguard of the revolution, when Egypt’s Islamists shed
their cloak of unity with secular liberals and declared their
intention to pursue their own agenda:”
Leaders of the April 6th movement, religious parties, and
leftist groups had agreed to a demonstration of solidarity
without religious banners or slogans that might divide them.
But liberal groups were dumbfounded when the Muslim
Brotherhood and Salafist groups started unfurling banners
denouncing secularism and calling for religious law. …
Days later, in actions one liberal blogger called ‘our
Kristallnacht,’ the young idealists suffered another painful
23 Arshad Mohammed, “U.S. Shifts to Closer Contact with Egypt
Islamists.” Reuters , 30 June 2011. http://www.reuters.com.
24 Josh Gerstein, “DNI Clapper retreats from ‘secular’ claim on Muslim
Brotherhood.” Politico , 10 February 2011. http://www.politico.com.
25 Nina Shea, “Egypt’s Copts: Will the Regions Largest Non-Muslim
Religious Community Simply Disappear?” New Republic , 10 June 2011.
http://www.newrepublic.com
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blow. When they least expected it, the army went after their
last remaining sign of strength, a tent city at Tahrir.…When
hundreds of soldiers started beating the protestors and shoot-
ing in the air, large crowds of Egyptians joined them, chanting,
‘Allahu Akbar.’26
The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, at first praised for
relative restraint as it assumed control of the post-Mubarak
transition government, after the crackdown in April, continued
to brutally attack demonstrators. In addition, it prosecuted regime
critics in military tribunals, sexually assaulted female protestors
and maintained the hated emergency law. In October, 2011, state
action took an explicitly anti-Christian turn.WhenCopts staged a
peaceful protest in reaction to the torching of a church and other
shows of intimidation, themilitary response was cruel and brutal.
According to Copts themselves, who produced photographs to
prove it, a massacre ensued. Muslims who joined the demonstra-
tion “seemed to split between those who sided with the military
and those who tried to shield the Christians.”27
As the military used force to intimidate civilians and Islamists
demonstrated their release from Mubarak-era restraints, the po-
sition of Christians deteriorated rapidly. But the White House
continued to describe violence against Christians as “sectarian
violence.” At no time did President Obama, Secretary Clinton,
Secretary Panetta or other members of the Obama administration
take a forthright, unambiguous stand for a truly free and demo-
cratic transition in Egypt that included human rights, religious
liberty, civil society and the impartial rule of law.
On Copticliterature.wordress.com, we find an outcry not only
against the brutality of the new Egyptian regime, but also against
the small-hearted response by the US and British governments,
particularly in regard to theMasperoMassacre of October, 2011:
“But while many in the West were deeply troubled and wanted
their governments to act by protecting the Copts of Egypt, some
of the responses that we saw coming from the West’s center of
power failed to respond to the people’s concerns. The responses
of Britain and the United States of America were particularly
troubling. Their politicians, sadly, did not match their nations in
their outrage as newswires cabled and reported the bloody
Sunday in Cairo. What did President of the United States of
America–that great country which the Copts love and look for as
leader of the free world–had [have] to say about the massacre of
the peaceful and unarmed Copts by Egypt’s army? I will simply
copy the White House statement on the event (it calls it ‘vio-
lence’ and does not mention the word massacre.)”28
In a distressing addition to multiple instances in which
President Obama has described the slaughter of innocents as
“violence” between two flawed sides, the White House stated
in a memorandum following the massacre: “The President is
deeply concerned about the violence in Egypt that has led to a
tragic loss of life among demonstrators and security forces.…
Now is a time for restraint on all sides so that Egyptians can
move forward together to forge a strong and united Egypt.”29
The memorandum went on to state the “belief” that the rights
of minorities “including Copts” should be respected, but end-
ed by giving Prime Minister Sharaf credit for calling for an
investigation and appealing to “all parties to refrain from
violence.”
This moral equivalence and indifference to human suffer-
ing–this verbal gift to tyrants by way of calling murderous
crackdowns on peaceful protestors “violence”-is an affront to
the principles that the United States, at its best, stands for.
Where was the outcry from American citizens in response to
this degradation of the American tradition? Yes, there was
some passion in response to the harassment and detention by
the Egyptian government of our own citizens working for
NGOs. But, where was the passion for our fellow human
beings? It would be nice if our leaders encouraged, rather than
discouraged, the oft-observed American concern for the
world’s oppressed.
Asmore violence against Christians occurred-including the
burning of churches, sexual harassment of women and girls,
bullying on the streets and forced confessions for crimes not
committed-our President and Secretary of State stayed mostly
silent.
The Muslim Brotherhood Reveals its True Aims
In January 2012, Islamists (the Muslim Brotherhood and the
more extreme Salafists) won 72% of the seats in the lower
house of Egypt’s Parliament. The Brotherhood won 235 out of
498 parliamentary seats. Also in January, the Brotherhood’s
deputy leader Dr. Rashad Bayoumi said the Brotherhood
would not recognize Israel “under any circumstance,” would
“never” negotiate with Israelis, and would take legal proce-
dures towards canceling the peace treaty.30 In spite of this,
White House press secretary Jay Carney urged listeners not to
“judge the disposition” of a government and parliament that
was only “just beginning to take shape,”while Hillary Clinton
emphasized that “what parties call themselves is less impor-
tant than what they do.”What was important, she said, was the
Brotherhood’s adherence to democratic procedures. State
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Department spokesman Mark Toner stated, “We’ve been very
clear about how we view the Muslim Brotherhood, which is
that if they’re committed to the democratic process, we wel-
come them as part of the political process.”31
Coptic Christians and Egyptian secularists were neither as
hopeful, nor as welcoming. Avi Asher-Schapior reported,
“Although Egypt’s nascent democratic institutions inspire
little confidence …Coptic groups have directly petitioned
Egypt’s parliament, completely bypassing the clerical hierar-
chy. In a caustic letter addressed to the Muslim Brotherhood’s
parliamentary majority last January, the Union of Maspero
Youth questioned the ruling Islamists’ commitment to equal-
ity: ‘Will you rule us according to law or will you deal with us
as a minority and Christians and how will you deal with our
women and how will you see their faces and their uncovered
hair?’ the letter read. As the confrontational tone of the letter
suggests, far from feeling represented by Egypt’s first demo-
cratic parliament, many Copts view the institution with open
hostility.”32 But, as Shadi Hamid has shown, “Egypt’s frac-
tious opposition spent little time thinking seriously about what
it would do in power” thereby allowing the more organized
and prepared Muslim Brotherhood to mobilize.
Behind the scenes, American policies went even fur-
ther than public statements in legitimizing the Muslim
Brotherhood and boosting their status. Front Page
Magazine broke the story that the State Department’s
Special Coordinator for Middle East Transitions William
Taylor–and his office–had been giving Egyptian
Islamists training to prepare for the election contests
that began on November 28th. Taylor justified this by
saying assistance was available to all parties and that
“sometimes Islamist parties show up, sometimes they
don’t.”33 In addition, the Department of Homeland
Security issued new guidelines that empowered
Brotherhood members as interlocutors with Muslims in
the United States and required FBI training materials to
be approved by Muslim “community leaders” and “in-
terfaith groups.” The White House issued a “National
Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent
Violent Extremism” that effectively guaranteed the
Muslim Brotherhood a say in its policies. Deputy
Secretary of State Bill Burns met with Mohamed
Morsi in Washington, indicating high-level outreach to
Islamist leaders. Morsi welcomed the meeting and called
on Washington to adopt a “positive position concerning
Arab and Muslim causes.”34
Hillary Clinton described all of this as “re-engagement in
light of Egyptian developments.” According to the New York
Times , “Mr. Obama told aids he was impressed with the
Egyptian leader’s [Morsi’s] pragmatic confidence. He sensed
an engineer’s precision with surprisingly little ideology.”35
President Obama and Secretary Clinton took this stance even
though the marriage of convenience between the Egyptian
military and theMuslimBrotherhoodwas already in evidence,
as was the Brotherhood’s Islamist, anti-Christian agenda. By
January, 2012, the military junta andMuslimBrotherhood had
formed a power-sharing agreement. Amnesty International’s
Middle Eastern director Hassiba Hadj Sahraoui intoned, “That
theMinister of Justice could now give an army responsible for
killing, torture, and thousands of arbitrary arrests and unfair
trials the power to arrest and detain civilians beggars belief. It
is nothing less than legally sanctioning abuse.”36
Carolyn Glick’s report on the implications of the agree-
ment, and on the repression of Christians and women in the
new Egypt, is enlightening:
This is bad news for women and non-Muslims. Egypt’s
Coptic Christians have been under continuous attack by
Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist supporters since Mu-
barak was deposed. Their churches, homes and busi-
nesses have been burned, looted and destroyed. Their
wives and daughters have been raped. The military
massacred them when they dared to protest their perse-
cution. As for women, their main claim to fame since
Mubarak’s overthrow has been their sexual victimiza-
tion at the hands of soldiers who stripped female pro-
testers and performed ‘virginity tests’ on them. Out of
nearly five hundred seats in parliament, only 10 will be
filled by women. The Western media are centering their
attention on what the next Egyptian constitution will
look like and whether it will guarantee rights for women
and minorities. What they fail to recognize is that the
Islamic fundamentalists now in charge of Egypt don’t
need a constitution to implement their tyranny. All they
require is what they already have–a public awareness of
their political power and their partnership with the
military.37
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On April 14, 2012, Egypt's high election commission
disqualified 10 of the 23 presidential candidates on various
grounds, leaving Egyptians with thirteen presidential candi-
dates. Unfortunately, many moderates and Christians vetoed
the elections in protest of a post-Mubarak system they be-
lieved had already gone astray. The two highest vote receivers,
who would then face each other in elections, were a member
of the Muslim Brotherhood (Mohamed Morsi), and Hosni
Mubarak’s last prime minister, who was part of the military
establishment.
Muslim Brotherhood leaders had themselves offered and
pledged not to run a candidate for president. But that was
according to the old rules–under which a party that described
the destruction of Israel and the institution of Sharia Law as
goals was viewed with alarm. Obama and Clinton themselves
threw out the old rules. No wonder the Brotherhood ignored
its pledge and ran a candidate for the presidency. Who ran and
won? Mohamed Morsi, who had been so generously greeted
in Washington, and whose “pragmatism” had been praised by
the president himself.
While some groups boycotted the presidential election due
to the collaboration between the hated military and the
Brotherhood in the run-up to the election, due to revelations
about corruption in the parliamentary elections, and due to
discontent with the choices available, Brotherhood activists
refused to boycott the election. Reported Richard Spencer
from Cairo, “The group, which won the parliamentary elec-
tions that have now been ruled invalid, issued a statement
saying Egypt was facing a ‘counter-revolution plainly
witnessed by all.’ …Many revolutionary activists are calling
on voters to spoil their ballots as a protest against what they
see as manipulation of the election.”38 Reported Sarah El
Deeb of the Associated Press , “Whoever wins after two days
of voting, Egypt’s military rulers will remain ultimately at the
helm, a sign of how Egypt’s revolution has gone astray
16 months after millions forced Mubarak to step down in the
name of freedom …we are forced to make this choice. ‘We
hate them both’ said Sayed Zeinhom at Cairo’s Boulak el-
Dakrour… .”39
In his first public speech as President, on June 24, 2012,
Morsi provided reason for both hope and fear. He said, "We
came to the world with a message of peace. We will maintain
international charters and conventions and the commitments
and agreements Egypt has signed with the world.…We will
also work to make the Egyptian system of ethics… in addition
to human values particularly in freedoms, respect for human
rights, maintaining rights of women and children." He praised
“God's help and these sacrifices, the precious blood of our
honourable martyrs and our great injured men." He also
praised the military: "I love them [soldiers] and appreciate
their role and show keenness to strengthen them."40 Like most
would-be dictators, he claimed he stood for unity and urged
his countrymen to put aside their differences. “"I invite you,
the great Egyptian people… to cement bonds amongst us, to
strengthen our comprehensive national unity.…This national
unity is the only way to get Egypt out of this difficult crisis.”
As for the marriage of convenience between the Muslim
Brotherhood and the military, it was less necessary for both
groups once they had succeeded in marginalizing moderate
reformers. After the presidential election, the Brotherhood and
the military at times collaborated, and at times struggled
against each other for power. Initially, the reformist groups
that the revolution had left behind wanted nothing to do with
either. As Shadi Hamid put it, “In the new Egypt, the military
and the revolutionaries quickly found they wanted different
things. The former wished to preserve stability at all costs,
while the latter wished to push forward aggressively with
democratization.”41
As presidential voting came to an end, the Supreme
Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) issued a constitutional
declaration, in which it granted itself extended powers, includ-
ing legislative, constitution drafting and other supervisory
activities. It announced a parliamentary election to take place
one month after approval of the constitution, thus attempting
to unilaterally determine the issue of whether the current
parliament had been legitimately elected. The SCAF had
previously promised a full transfer to civilian rule after the
election. Egyptians were thus faced with a new “democratic”
government that was dominated by two groups (the
Brotherhood and the Army) that had already broken major
promises.
President Morsi, too, moved quickly to use his victory to
maximize Muslim Brotherhood control of Egyptian govern-
ment and Egyptian society. In July, he chose an unknown
former water minister sympathetic to Brotherhood ideas,
Hesham Qandil, as his prime minister. The Prime Minister,
in turn, appointed only one Copt to his cabinet, despite the
president’s previously announced commitment to include
greater numbers of Copts in his government. An alliance of
pro-democracy advocates called The National Front Alliance
that included secularists and moderate Muslims publicly crit-
icized Morsi’s reneging on his promise to form a “unity
government.”42 The lack of a new constitution, and the
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intentional exclusion of pro-democracy groups from key lead-
ership positions further damaged the legitimacy of Morsi’s
government.
Of course, the unity Morsi praised was a pipedream, as
each faction-the military, the elected Brotherhood, the
Judiciary-fought for dominance. Unity would soon mean op-
pression of those who didn’t agree with Brotherhood-Islamist
goals, and the real goals of the Brotherhood would soon
become apparent. Morsi would tacitly accept Brotherhood
and Salafist violence against and intimidation of Christian
Copts. He would push a Constitution that declared Sharia
law “the main source of legislation” and would move to undo
the independence of the judiciary, which was packed with
judges appointed by former President Mubarak. He would
state that the peace treaty with Israel would eventually have
to be “revised”while making positive gestures toward Hamas.
He would issue edicts that granted him immunity from ap-
peals in courts for any decisions or laws he declared until a
new constitution and parliament were in place. Significantly,
his most dramatic moves toward near-absolute power would
come in November, 2012, at a time when he was enjoying
abundant, unsparing praise from President Obama and
Secretary Clinton for brokering a cease-fire between Israel
and Gaza’s Hamas. This shows clearly that our “partnership”
with the new Egypt should have been tempered with our use
of strategic leverage and our advocacy of democratic
principles.
Engagement with Brotherhood leaders in the spirit of re-
specting the wishes of the Egyptian people, in the attempt to
encourage continued close relations between the United States
and Egypt-or in the attempt to encourage moderation on the
part of the Brotherhood-are one thing. But, the lack of dem-
onstrated U.S. enthusiasm for human rights and individual
rights, and the lack of demonstrated U.S. concern for Israel’s
rapidly deteriorating position as it faced the likelihood of an
Islamist Egypt should give us pause. Stated Human Rights
First on the one year anniversary of the Egyptian uprising,
“The U.S. government should now focus on delivering a
sustained clear message about its policies and goals in
Egypt, one that emphasizes U.S. support for civilian demo-
cratic rule. … The only way to advance democracy is by
implementing the democratic process and building safeguards
for democratic rights and freedoms as the process moves
forward.”43 But, Obama and Clinton spoke up for democracy
rarely, and when they did, their speech lacked direction and
conviction. They did not use U.S. influence to “safeguard”
democracy. Moreover, their foreign policy team focused far
too little on the strategic consequences of the Muslim
Brotherhood’s ascendancy.
This is not to say that the administration was wrong in
attempting to forge positive relations; American policy has
often included trying to nudge activist groups toward more
moderate means and ends by forging ties with them.
Moreover, we cannot support democracy in the Middle East
without accepting that voters might very well vote Islamists
into power. I was not in favor of an intractable stand regarding
the Muslim Brotherhood due to concern for participatory
government and due to sympathy with Brotherhood griev-
ances under Mubarak. But, the Obama administration’s reac-
tion to events in Egypt lacked strategic or pro-democracy
direction. In the words of one conservative columnist, the
approach was “apathetic” and “dilatory.” In the words of one
liberal columnist, it was “uncertain” and “weak.” Especially
disturbing, the only consistent policy, before, during and after
the revolution, was reaching out to the Muslim Brotherhood.
We should not have taken our support of the Brotherhood
so far, and we should have done more to support other
freedom-seeking Egyptians: those who relied on the fact that
power was about to devolve away from Mubarak and had
placed hope in reform; those who had marched in rebellion
against the regime in hopes of creating liberal democracy;
those who boycotted elections and objected to the new gov-
ernment because they saw the entire system as rigged. As Neil
Ferguson put it, “If we want to see secular-democratic forces
prevail in a country like Egypt, which is overwhelmingly a
Muslim country, which has a tradition of Islamic radicalism in
the form of the Muslim brotherhood, it is not going to happen
by itself. The lesson from Eastern Europe, going right back to
the Cold War, is that the United States had to very actively
support democratic forces until finally the moment came in
1989 when they could step forward into the limelight and they
were ready.” Ferguson added, “We haven’t got a plan here,
and if we don’t have a plan to build a secular democracy in
Egypt, it’s not going to happen.”44
Hillary Clinton insisted that it is not “who” is in power in
Egypt that matters, but “what” they choose to do that matters.
By her own logic, then, why wouldn’t we have made the
continuation of billions of dollars in annual aid to Egypt
contingent upon the Brotherhood’s recognition of the state
of Israel, the group’s discontinuation of support for Hamas,
and improvement in human rights and civil liberties? Instead,
in March of 2012, the White House indicated that Secretary
Clinton would use her “waiver authority” to release part of the
1.5 billion in aid to Egypt, thereby bypassing a law requiring
that more aid to Egypt be contingent upon Egypt’s improve-
ment in human rights and transition to civilian government.
A statement issued by the State Department defending the
move is telling: “As the Secretary’s statement makes clear, as
the statement we released with regard to her decision makes
43 Neil Hicks, “Egypt’s Transition to Democracy One Year On:
Recommendations for U.S. Policy.” Human Rights First 26 January
2012. http://www.humanrightsfirst.org.
44 Niall Ferguson, Real Clear Politics Video, 14 February 2011, www.
realclearpolitics.com.
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clear, we have a huge number of interests and equities at stake
in relationship with Egypt. This is a strategic partnership; so
rather than talking about leverage, we’re talking about part-
nership, as we have for all these years. … We have a new
Egypt emerging. So U.S. support in all of its forms–FMF,
ESF, in countries around the world–is designed to allow us to
support the partnership that we have with countries and the
developments that we want to see in countries in a more
democratic, prosperous, stable, secure direction.”
“Rather than talking about leverage, we’re talking about
partnership.” That statement encapsulates the Obama adminis-
tration’s approach to the Muslim Brotherhood. Before the
Brotherhood won seats in parliamentary elections; before the
Brotherhood broke promises that it would not run in presiden-
tial elections; before the Brotherhood consolidated power and
made deals with the Egyptian military and security forces;
before discrimination against the Christian Copts devolved into
persecution and violence; before the emergence of a constitu-
tion that enshrined Sharia Law and mostly excluded the wishes
of moderate Muslims, Christians and secularists –— before all
of this and after all of this , the Obama administration treated
the Muslim Brotherhood as a partner.
Many in Congress expressed disappointment in the deci-
sion to unconditionally release the aid, including Democratic
Senator Patrick Leahy, who stated, “I know Secretary Clinton
wants the democratic transition in Egypt to succeed, but by
waiving the conditions we send a contradictory message. The
Egyptian military should be defending fundamental freedoms
and the rule of law, not harassing and arresting those who are
working for democracy. They should end trials of civilians in
military courts and fully repeal the Emergency Law, and our
policy should not equivocate on these key reforms.”45
President of Freedom House David Kramer chimed in, “The
decision to waive the conditions, partially or in full, on mili-
tary aid sends the wrong message to the Egyptian govern-
ment–that U.S. taxpayers will subsidize the Egyptian military
while it continues to oversee the crackdown on civil society
and to commit human rights abuses. … A resumption of
military aid also sends the wrong message to the Egyptian
people–that we care only about American NGO workers, not
about the aspirations of the Egyptian people to build democ-
racy.”46 Stephen McInerney, executive director of the Project
on Middle East Democracy, also criticized the decision, “par-
ticularly as Egyptian and American organizations working to
support Egypt’s transition to democracy remain very much
under threat.”47
The Obama administration’s unconditional support of the
Muslim Brotherhood helped legitimize the group as the
rightful representative of Egyptian people, when, actually, its
popularity and place in Egyptian society was tenuous.
Michael Wahid Hanna observed that the administration had
given “outsized attention on the cultivation of ties with the
now ascendant Muslim Brotherhood, often heedless of
broader Egyptian political dynamics.” He went on, “The
United States cannot micromanage Egyptian politics, but it
retains real influence and it can, at the very least, attempt to
staunch negative trends as opposed to reinforcing moral haz-
ards. The current Egyptian government now believes in its
own centrality and strategic significance, and it further be-
lieves that it has the uncritical support of the United States and
the international community.”48
Why would President Obama and Secretary Clinton not
take a clear stand for human rights and the rule of law in
Egypt, and why would they not use financial leverage to press
for improvement in these matters? I use the word clear
because Clinton did on occasion defend rights in Egypt and
elsewhere. Suchwas the case in her statement upon the release
of the State Department’s Report on International Religious
Freedom in September, 2011. She said: “Hatred and intoler-
ance are destabilizing. When governments crack down on
religious expression, when politicians or public figures try to
use religion as a wedge issue, or when societies fail to take
steps to denounce religious bigotry and curb discrimination
based on religious identity, they embolden extremists and fuel
sectarian strife. And the reverse is also true: When govern-
ments respect religious freedom, when they work with civil
society to promote mutual respect, or when they prosecute
acts of violence against members of religious minorities, they
can help turn down the temperature. They can foster a public
aversion to hateful speech without compromising the right to
free expression. And in doing so, they create a climate of
tolerance that helps make a country more stable, more secure,
and more prosperous.”49 Clinton was careful to couch her
plug for religious freedom in terms of its practical benefits
(stability, security, prosperity); as usual, she was careful not to
take an overt moral position.
Such statements were welcome exceptions to the adminis-
tration’s general stance of impassivity, but troubling questions
remained. Here’s a particularly troubling question: Why has
the administration been mostly silent and indifferent about the
persecution of Christian Copts, secular-reformist groups and
women in the new Egypt? By April, 2012, Egypt’s Coptic
Orthodox Church was announcing its withdrawal from the
constitutional assembly’s drafting of a new constitution, say-
ing its domination by Islamists made Coptic participation
“pointless.” Other liberal parties joined in announcing their
45 Josh Rogin, “Clinton Waives restrictions on U.S. aid to Egypt.” The
Cable 22 March 2012. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com.
46 Ibid.
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Policy 26 February 2013. http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com.
49 Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton, “Remarks at the Release of the
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withdrawal from the assembly, seeing their hopes for repre-
sentative government as already lost. Given the administra-
tion’s early support for Brotherhood “participation” in Egypt’s
government, this would have been a good time to pressure the
Brotherhood tomake participation palatable to Christians and
others who had been excluded and/or were threatened by the
new power structure. Again, by the Clinton’s own logic-if it is
not who rules but what they do that matters-why the silence in
response to what Morsi and the military have “done?” Why
the non-response to the cries of the oppressed for US support?
Not surprisingly, when Secretary Clinton visited Egypt in
July 2012, she was met with widespread protest from
Christian Copts and secular activists, who objected to what
they believed was the administration’s role in helping the
Muslim Brotherhood consolidate power. Citing a stream of
meetings between high-level administration officials and
Muslim Brotherhood leaders, Egyptian-American human
rights activist Michael Meunier explained frustration over
US policy: “The MB used these high-level meetings to tell
the Egyptian people that the U.S. is supporting them and does
not object to their rule. Many of us reached out to US officials
at the State Department and complained that the US policy
regarding the MB was putting the secular forces in Egypt at a
disadvantage because it seemed to be propping the MB, but
our concerns were dismissed. We warned of the MB’s desire
to impose Sharia law once in power and the grim effect it
would have on the rights of the millions of Christians and
moderate Muslims, and on women and children, yet all our
warnings were dismissed.”50
Human rights groups estimate that more than 100,000
Copts have left Egypt since the revolution.51 Many Copts
have been denied property rights, and protection of the law.
Coptic-owned businesses have been harassed, while
Christians report that they have been taunted and maligned,
and sexually targeted. There has been a dramatic upsurge in
assaults on Copts and attacks on Coptic churches, and the
government and military chose to look the other way. No
wonder the US Commission on International Religious
Freedom asked the State Department to place Egypt on its list
of “countries of particular concern” regarding the egregious
violation of religious freedom. The State Department de-
clined, saying it prefers to work with the Egyptian government
to improve conditions for Christians.
Speaking at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace on July 30, 2012, Clinton did indicate, however, that
she was aware of the Egyptian Christian’s plight: “I heard
from Christians who want to know that they will be accorded
the same rights and respect as all Egyptians in a new
government led by the Islamist party. … They wonder, will
a government looking explicitly to greater reliance on Islamic
principles stand up for non-Muslims and Muslims equally.
Since this is the first time Egypt has been in this situation, it’s a
fair question.”52
Indeed, it was a fair question, which should have led to
another: What could the United States do to encourage a more
positive outcome?
Egypt Steps Up Repression
Those Egyptians who had hoped the new Constitution would
secure more freedoms and lead to civil society were to be
disappointed. The problem was not just that the Constitution
itself did not adequately protect rights of minority groups and
individuals. The problem was that, in the spirit of all would-be
dictators, President Morsi issued extra-constitutional decrees,
placed restrictions on the press, clamped down on the oppo-
sition, and discriminated against and marginalized certain
groups. Pressure upon Egyptian journalists, Christians, secu-
larists and human rights groups, combined with pressure upon
NGOS working within Egypt for democratic reform quickly
signaled that America’s “outreach” to Morsi did not translate
into improvements in the lives of most Egyptians, nor into the
strengthening of US/Egyptian strategic ties. When threats to
our NGO workers were ultimately resolved with their release,
the administration took no stand for the Egyptians themselves
who were still facing criminal charges for their association
with the NGOs.
In what appeared to be a positive breakthrough on the
geopolitical front, in November, 2012, Morsi helped broker
a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. He received lavish
praise from President Obama and Secretary Clinton for doing
so, with Clinton lending the occasion visibility with a brief
stop in Egypt for personal talks with the Egyptian president.
However, as Dennis B. Ross and James F. Jeffrey of the
Washington Institute observed in their Strategic Report,
“[But] Morsi’s behavior domestically the day after the
ceasefire should again remind us of his basic purpose and
orientation: he immediately sought to parlay his role in the
ceasefire and the international plaudits he won for it by re-
moving all judicial oversight on his exercise of power.”53 The
fact that Morsi made this power grab just after personal
conversations with Hillary Clinton, and that the administration
did not criticize him for it, were also painful reminders that the
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administration’s policy favored “regional stability” over hu-
man rights, and did not, in the spirit of our best foreign policy
traditions, work for both.
In spite of the huge risks incurred by expressing opposition
to the increasingly repressive government, Egyptians took to
the streets en masse in November, 2012, to protest rigged
elections, the opaque process of writing the Constitution, the
assault on the judiciary and its rulings and the government’s
failure to institute genuine democratic reforms. After a night
of street fighting between Morsi supporters and secular oppo-
nents left at least 6 dead and 450 wounded, nine Morsi
administration officials quit in protest. One of those who quit
was the new general secretary of the commission overseeing
the planned referendum. “I will not participate in a referendum
that spilled Egyptian blood,” he said.54
In December, Coptic Nationalists announced that they
would boycott the referendum on the constitution, calling it
“an Islamist constitution and not an Egyptian constitution”
and saying there were no assurances of “fairness and trans-
parency” in the referendum. Noting that the Brotherhood’s
and Salafists votes in previous elections were “magnified by
those non-Islamist Egyptians who saw at the time that Morsi
was the lesser evil compared to Shafi, who was seen as part of
Mubarak’s regime,” they declared: “The situation has now
changed: the dictatorial nature of the Islamists has been re-
vealed to millions of Egyptians; their incompetence in man-
aging the affairs of the country has been remarkable; and the
economic situation is deteriorating while the country is ap-
proaching complete collapse.”55 It is telling that while
President Morsi would concede part of the decree that re-
moved judicial restraints on his power, he refused to delay the
referendum on the constitution for the sake of promoting the
“unity” he supposedly wanted.
Strikingly, the United States agreed to send F-16 s to the
Egyptian government and to give Egypt additional aid at
precisely this time of growing fallout-when Egyptians were
taking to the streets en masse in protest. The message was
clear: US support of the Morsi government remained uncon-
ditional. Egyptians were thus indirectly pressure by the United
States itself to get behind the government and to tone down
their expectations. Discussing the US decision to deliver the
advanced aircraft to the Egyptian military, retired Brigadier
General Safwat Al-Zayat toldAl-AhramWeekly, “It is obvious
that the finalization of the deal on 11 December, which hap-
pened to be at the height of the mass demonstrations in Tahrir
Square against Morsi, conveyed a political message. Between
the lines, Washington was sending a message to three parties.
The first was to Morsi and it states, ‘We support you. Move
ahead.’ The second was to the army and it said, ‘We are
encouraging this man,’ meaning Morsi. The third was to the
opposition and is said the same thing.”56
With most Christians and secularists having resigned in
protest, the constitution passed with 63% of the vote after its
second referendum on December 22. Protests erupted again,
this time against the rushed and distorted process which had
enabled an Islamist-oriented constitution. Youtube videos cap-
tured gangs of men loyal to the Muslim Brotherhood beating
and assaulting protestors. Around the country, Coptic
Christians were being bullied, intimidated and even raped,
with immunity. Sharia Law was being instituted, step by step.
Significantly, however, the US administration linked its
support for a massive new infusion of financial aid to cooper-
ation with the International Monetary Fund instead of with
progress on religious freedom and human rights. Not only
that, the new loan was supported in spite of Morsi’s
Islamization of Egyptian government and society. The
Washington Post reported on January 6, 2013, “Egyptian
President Mohamed Morsi rebuilt his cabinet Sunday, replac-
ing 10 ministers and amplifying the Islamist presence in the
government. The move, in which at least three Islamists were
appointed to major economic ministries, comes a day ahead of
a planned visit by a top International Monetary Fund official
to discuss an impending 4.8 billion loan.…. Islamist political
parties gave their support to the latest move, but some oppo-
sition members criticized it, saying it served only to further
consolidate Islamite control of top government positions
weeks after a conflict over the religious character of Egypt’s
new constitution left the country bitterly divided.”57
When, shortly thereafter, a video was released showing
Morsi spewing anti-Semitic rhetoric, Shoshan Bryen of the
Gatestone Institute had this to say: “The Obama administra-
tion placed a very heavy bet on its ability to manage relations
with Morsi, and the world’s discovery of his virulent anti-
Semitism will not change it. Key to ‘managing relations’ with
Morsi is ignoring almost everything related to the Muslim
Brotherhood and everything Morsi does that defies democrat-
ic norms. This includes ignoring the Brotherhood’s lie that it
would not run candidates for all the seats in parliament and
would not run a presidential candidate. It includes ignoring
massacres against the Coptic Christian community; the hasty
construction of the constitution; the dismissal of judges; the
quick-and-dirty ‘referendum’ that claims 63 % of the vote
without noting that less than 25 % of Egyptians voted; and
the December protests. It requires, then, allowingMorsi to run
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roughshod over the Egyptian people, much as his predecessor
did.”58
By March 2013, even the Center for American Progress
was gently criticizing the Obama administration for not not
using its leverage and enunciating democratic principles with
more consistency. Brian Katulis, Ken Sofer and Peter Juul,
pointed to the “looming political legitimacy crisis” in Egypt
and said “it remains uncertain how much leverage the United
States has managed to build for itself inside Egypt.” Noting
that the current policy approach “with its focus on the links
between security and economics, has served someUS national
security interests in the short term,” they said: “Nevertheless
this policy approach has limitations, given the messy political
transition process and the growing political and social divi-
sions inside Egypt. The Obama administration has done an
excellent job advancing America’s security interests in the
region, but it can domore tomake clear to Egypt’s new leaders
that support of democratic values by the current ruling author-
ities in Egypt is just as vital as maintaining security coopera-
tion. …. As Egypt heads into the next phase of its transition,
the United States should continue to outline more clearly and
consistently that it seeks to support a truly free and democratic
transition in Egypt. It should also underscore that US interests
and values are at stake.”59
Even critics of American “unilateralism” and of what they
saw as Bush’s overly zealous Mideast policies were starting to
criticize America’s seeming indifference to the Egyptian peo-
ples’ plight and its unwillingness to pressure Morsi’s govern-
ment. Michael Wahid Hanna noted that “unconditional sup-
port of nominal allies will endanger the very stability that the
United States prizes.” His prescription for better policy cen-
tered around “conditional engagement” merits attention:
The United States must make clear to regimes that its
support cannot substitute for the support of a country’s
own citizens, and that the judgments of those citizens
regarding their regime’s legitimacy must ultimately dic-
tate the position of the United States. This is a critical
message for America’s undemocratic allies in the re-
gion, and this conditional engagement represents the
only plausible path forward for the United States. The
uneven performance of the region’s democratically
elected Islamist leaders also suggests a policy approach
toward states that have suppressed the forces for
change—namely, encouragement of bottom-up democ-
ratization. Doing this would include taking steps such as
pressing for municipal and provincial elections as a
precursor to broader reforms. In pushing such a course
on countries that have avoided regime change, the Unit-
ed States can explore anew the feasibility of more grad-
ual reform, which has often been employed rhetorically
by authoritarians to avoid actual reform. Further, an
approach that seeks to impart governing responsibilities
upon opposition groups will ease their potential transi-
tion to national leadership. The United States also
should not make assumptions about the inevitable role
of Islamists. While they remain the most organized and
potent political force inmany countries in the region, the
United States shouldn’t view the Arab world with an
essentialist lens that sees in Islamist rule the natural
equilibrium. Such an approach will alienate non-
Islamist political forces and encourage the monopoliza-
tion of power by Islamist groups.… Assuming Islamist
predominance will also create a misplaced permissive-
ness with respect to religiously based repression. What
might be termed the soft bigotry of Orientalist expecta-
tions would undermine notions of universal values and
encourage an inherently unstable model of governance
that will ill serve U.S. regional interests and undermine
the prospects for peaceful and sustainable change.60
Nowhere has the Obama administration’s neglect of human
rights and democracy in the formation of foreign policy been
more devastating than in the Middle East, where it has led to
indifference to human longing and human suffering and to the
enabling of some of the world’s worst regimes. Obama and
Clinton said nary a word in support of Iranian dissidents
languishing in notorious Iranian prisons. Unlike their prede-
cessors, they did nothing behind the scenes to encourage
Egyptian ally Mubarak to embrace democracy and did very
little to encourage his Islamist successors toward toleration of
Christians and moderates. They came very close to ignoring
the bloodbath in Syria and did ignore it at first. They were
mute and passive in response to Assad’s massacre of peaceful
protestors, who were part of what was originally a genuinely
pro-democracy movement, and to Iran’s brutal snuffing out of
the Green movement. They said nothing about Syria’s brutal
occupation of Lebanon.
This is perhaps the most troubling flaw of this administra-
tion’s foreign policy. It eschews morality and principles and
focuses on prosperity, security and “shared interests”-even
with dictatorships-instead. There is thus an untold irony in
this administration’s foreign policy: Its supposedly new policy
of outreach is based on outreach to those in power, however
oppressive they may be, and does not include outreach to the
people themselves. In the guise of a more open, progressive
foreign policy it actually prioritizes stability and reinforces
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those in power, including tyrants. It hoped that if it ignored the
Morsi regime’s repression, as the US often did for Mubarak’s
regime, it would gain Morsi’s cooperation. It forgets the oft-
observed connection between regime type and regime
behavior.
By spring of 2013, the situation in Egypt had deteriorated,
but there was still room for the United States to try to make a
positive difference. In what Amir Taheri cautiously termed a
hopeful sign, President Morsi announced fresh parliamentary
elections to take place in April. He delayed the timetable of the
elections by a week to meet the demands of Christian Copts
that the elections not coincide with Coptic Easter. Taheri noted
that Morsi had refused to issue an outright ban on political
parties or to actually close those opposition newspapers he
had pressured.61 In perhaps another hopeful sign, The
Freedom and Justice Party denounced violence that took place
outside the Coptic cathedral in Abbaseya, and stressed its
support for initiatives “to bridge gaps and preserve the
nation.”
While these were perhaps hopeful signs, there was reason
to view the Freedom and Justice Party’s denunciation of
violence with skepticism. In Persecuted , Marshall, Gilbert
and Shea disclose the “underreported fact” that “Christians
are the single most widely persecuted religious group in the
world today”–a fact confirmed by the Pew Research Center,
the Economist , the Vatican and other sources.62 Gilbert
asserted in a April 2013 blog on Ricochet , “Attacks on
Egypt’s Copts… have increased dramatically since the ouster
of strongman Hosni Mubarak. The present Muslim
Brotherhood regime makes virtually no effort to protect the
increasingly vulnerable Christian community.… He [Samuel
Tadros] writes, ‘In the past two years from April 2011 until
today, 59 Copts have been murdered: 28 inMaspero, 4 in Abu
Qurqas, 6 in Imbaba, 12 inMansheyet Nasser, 1 in Libya, 1 in
Dahshour, and 7 in Khosous.…714 Copts have been wound-
ed and no one has been tried for those attacks.”63
While stipulating that our influence would be “along the
margins,” and that Egypt will determine its political future,
Ross and Jeffreys urged the use of US leverage to convince
Egypt to maintain international obligations; to fight terror and
not provide a safe haven for terrorists; to respect minority and
women’s right; and permit political pluralism. To their list, I
would have added religious freedom.
They emphasized the difficulties of dealing with the
Muslim Brotherhood whose “values and beliefs fundamental-
ly challenge our own.” On the other hand, they stressed:
“Egypt’s profound economic needs provide us both the op-
portunity to be helpful and the leverage to provide ground
rules for our assistance. We should be very clear about what
matters to us and be prepared to use our assets, and the
considerable resources we can mobilize from others, to foster
the achievement of those objectives.”64
There was no reason to think that the Morsi government’s
commitment to democracy was more than half-hearted, or that
recent conciliatory gestures would have occurred were the
government not under extreme internal pressure. On the other
hand, for that very reason, there was reason for the United
States, finally, to make its support of the Morsi government
conditional . With enough internal and external pressure, that
included the imposition of clear, unwavering conditions for
US aid, and that included the clear, unwavering pronounce-
ment of democratic principles and strategic priorities, the
situation might possibly have improved. If it had improved
enough that Christians and secularists and women and
Muslim moderates actually believed enough in the legitimacy
of democratic processes that they participated in them–and
believed their voices would be heard and their votes would be
counted–Egypt might have turned a tenuous corner toward a
better future without revolution.
But the United States never took a stand for liberty and
human rights and never made a move to pressure the Morsi
government toward real reform. In a July 2013 article, Glenn
Kessler of theWashington Post aptly observed that the Morsi
government “didn’t have to pay any apparent price for its anti-
democratic actions.” Among such actions, Kessler noted,
“Morsi launched more prosecutions against reporters and
authors for the crime of ‘insulting the president’ than
Mubarak, Anwar Sadat, Gamal Abdel Nasser and previous
rulers put together.” … Kessler added, “Yet, in Tanzania,
Obama said, “decisions [on aid] are based on whether or not
a government is listening to the opposition [and] maintaining a
free press.”65
Revolution Again
On June 30th, 2013, millions of Egyptians emerged in soli-
darity onto the streets to protest President Morsi and his
regime. Fed up with the regime’s disregard of human rights
and constitutional freedoms, disastrous handling of the econ-
omy, and failure to address the people’s concerns, they
shouted, “Leave, leave!”Many of the protestors carried signs
with such slogans as “Obama Supports Morsi.” Journalist and
scholar Walid Phares explained in an interview,” We need to
understand what Egyptians are trying to say. Most Egyptians
are–with the exception of the Brotherhood obviously–very
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angry, very frustrated. …Not with the American public; they
love the American people and citizens, but with the Obama
administration because it openly was supporting the Muslim
Brotherhood regime.”66
In the wake ofmassive protests, Egypt’s army intervened in
support of Egyptians rebelling against Islamist authoritarian-
ism. When it suited its purposes, the military had opportunis-
tically allowed and abetted violence against the very secular-
ists, women and Christians with whom it now claimed an
alliance. Now, the military sought the endorsement of reli-
gious leaders, political leaders and youth activists, many of
whom shared the stage when General El-Sissi announced
Morsi’s ouster. The next day, the military announced that the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court had been
sworn in as president. As James Jay Carano and James
Phillips of the Heritage Foundation put it, “Egypt’s secular
and liberal opposition [turned to] Egypt’s army in despair,
angry that the Obama Administration uncritically supported
the Morsi regime.”67
Not surprisingly, after Morsi’s ouster, violence and chaos
erupted across Egypt as Islamists protested the “coup” against
their “elected president” while those who threw him out
insisted that Morsi’s presidency was illegitimate and violated
every principle of elective government.
As Brotherhood protests grew in intensity and violence,
and the military response grew in response, the Obama ad-
ministration seemed to find the voice for democracy it had
previously lost. Seemingly incapable of forthright speech or
action for liberty and human rights when the Muslim
Brotherhood was in power, the administration spoke out with
conviction against the actions of the military: As Reuters put
it, “Secretary of State John Kerry was unusually forthright in
condemning the state of emergency …. ‘In the past week, at
every occasion .. we and others have urged the government to
respect the rights of free assembly and free expression,
and we have also urged all parties to resolve this
impasse peacefully and underscored that demonstrators
should avoid violence and incitement,” Kerry said.
Some of the toughest U.S. messages were delivered per-
sonally to Sisi in almost daily telephone calls by Defense
Secretary Chuck Hagel, diplomats said. …The United States
took the rare step of signaling its displeasure to a strategic
Middle East ally, which has a peace treaty with Israel, by
halting delivery of four F-16 aircraft under its military aid
program last month.”68
Having been silent regarding the Morsi government’s
abuses, Obama made a rare (for him) statement in defense of
political liberty. He took a moral stand, which he had been
unwilling to do before. He declared that the new government
was embarking on a “dangerous path taken through arbitrary
arrests, a broad crackdown on Mr. Morsi’s associations and
supporter, and now tragically the violence that’s taken the
lives of hundreds of people and wounded thousands more.”
Without a word regarding the Morsi supporters’ violent at-
tacks on Christians and secularists, Obama said, “We deplore
the violence against civilians. We support universal rights
essential to dignity, including the right to peaceful protest.
We oppose the pursuit of martial law, which denies those
rights to citizens under the principle that security trumps
individual freedom, or that might makes right. And today
the United States extends its condolences to the families
who were killed and those who were wounded.”
Oh, what Egyptian secularists, Christians, women and
Muslim moderates would have done for such displays of
support from the American president. Oh, what peaceful
Iranian protestors and peaceful Syrian protestors would have
done for such words in their behalf. But this presidency has
been defined by not issuing such words, by moral neutrality,
and by “engagement” with the world’s worst tyrants.
Obama would have been right to insist that the new gov-
ernment make a distinction between Islamist extremists and
peaceful Muslim protestors and that it cease its excessive and
often discriminatory use of force. But Obama himself
overlooked the distinction, instead painting the Muslim
Brotherhood with broad, mostly flattering strokes. He failed,
for example, to object to the September 2013 campaign of
Brotherhood supporters to force the roughly 15,000 Christian
Copts of Daiga to pay a jizya tax, as tribute to Muslims. So
too, he failed to reach out to the large numbers of Egyptians
who, even though glad Morsi is gone, favor neither the
Brotherhood nor the military and could benefit from guidance
as they work for the creation of truly accountable and repre-
sentative government. In a recent article for the Daily Beast ,
Josh Rogin and Eli Lake observed that the Obama adminis-
tration is resorting to “revisionist history,” now claiming that
its decisions toward Egypt were always based on advocacy of
the rule of law, civil liberties and democracy.69 That, we know,
is patently not true . Rogin and Lake point out, for example,
that, in March, five senators proposed changing the way the
US gives aid to Egypt by placing more emphasis on safe-
guards of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. But the
Obama administration, led by Secretary Kerry and
66 Bill Hoffmann, “Walid Phares: Egyptians Mad at US Embrace of
Muslim Brotherhood.” 14 August 2013. www.newsmax.com
67 James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. and James Phillips, “Egypt: A Way
Forward After a Step Back.” 9 July 2013. www.heritage.org.
68 Paul Taylor, “Exclusive–West Warned Egypt’s Sisi to the End: Don’t
Do It.” Reuters 14 August 2013. www.reuters.com
69 Josh Rogin and Eli Lake, “Obama Offers a Revisionist History of His
Administration’s Approach to Egypt.” The Daily Beast 2 July 2013.
www.thedailybeast.com.
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Ambassador Patterson, fought those changes. Not only that,
Kerry delivered an additional 190 million of aid to Egypt that
very month, conditioning it only on economic (not political)
reform. Once the Morsi government was ousted, however, the
administration announced (against the advice of foreign policy
experts) that it was suspendingmost of the military and financial
aid it gives to the military, citing "decisions inconsistent with
democracy." As America recedes, Russia steps into the void;
Russian and Egyptian officials have begun discussions on de-
fense cooperation, with Russian ForeignMinister Sergei Lavrov
and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu meeting with Egyptian
Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy and Defense Minister Abdel
Fattah el-Sisi in the highest level Russian visit in years.
The US government must work feverishly to restore its
badly damaged reputation with the Egyptian people, and to
reestablish strategic and geopolitical leverage in the region,
for the stakes are terribly high. Now that it has rediscovered
words like freedom and rule of law, it must show that it
genuinely promotes and believes in such things. It must lend
its considerable resources and knowledge to those seeking to
establish civil society in Egypt. Yes, the administration should
pressure the Egyptian army to live up to its promises, but it
should apply similar pressure to Islamists. Our alliance with
Egypt is indispensable. Our demonstration of genuine support
for a freer political and economic system and greater
opportunity for the Egyptian people should be our up-
most priority –- not just because it benefits us to have a
stable and free ally in the Middle East, but because it is
within our best foreign policy traditions. It is the right
and the wise thing to do.
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